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1. Introduction
Economic theory is often used to explain ﬁnancial phenomena. We are interested in 
this study whether certain economic phenomena can be explained by ﬁnancial theory. 
We explore the causes of microenterprise-level wage rigidity and attempt to explain it 
from the ﬁnancial point of view. Chen, Shen and Zhou (2009) found that wages in 
non-listed companies exhibit downward rigidity (ﬁrm performance in a particular year 
shows a growth trend, but not wages), and also characteristics of upward rigidity (ﬁrm 
performance declines in a particular year, but wages remain unchanged). We too ﬁnd 
that the wages of A-share listed companies in China exhibit both upward and downward 
rigidity. There is a significant body of research within the economics literature that 
explores downward wage rigidity,1 but not from the ﬁnancial point of view. We have 
not found any published research that describes or explains upward wage rigidity. One 
reason may be that the existing research on wage rigidity in the labor economics ﬁeld 
concentrates on the individual level. Hence it draws on the incentive point of view to 
investigate the impact of changes in individual wages on staﬀ eﬀort. This makes it very 
diﬃcult to observe the impact of wages on an enterprise’s cash ﬂow and ﬁnancial risk. 
The majority of this research focuses on an interpretation of downward wage rigidity. 
Our study, in contrast, addresses the enterprise level. It also draws on the cash flow 
perspective to investigate the impact of changes in wages on future ﬁnancial risk. We 
focus on the relationship between changes in performance and wage movements to 
explain both upward and downward wage rigidity.
Workers’ wages involve labor remuneration and incentives and are an important 
component of production costs. Although executive compensation is also part of an 
enterprise’s expenses, executive compensation primarily manifests itself as incentives. 
Therefore, the relationship between remuneration changes and performance sensitivity 
inevitable differs between workers and executives. Normally, the total remuneration 
of workers is greater than that of senior executives. Changes in workers’ remuneration 
have a bigger impact on cash flows and this may have a significant consequence on 
1 The economics literature provides a multi-dimensional explanation for downward wage rigidity, primarily 
drawing on the institutional and economic theory perspectives. The former considers that it is due to such 
institutional factors as government wage regulation, legislative protection, trade unions and collective 
bargaining, (Franz et al., 2006; Agell and Bennmarker, 2002; Stiglitz, 2000). The economic theory perspective 
comprises contract theory (Fischer, 1977), implicit contract theory (Baily, 1974), the sabotage model of 
efficiency wage theory (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), the gift exchange model (Akerlof, 1984), the adverse 
selection model (Weiss, 1990), the employee turnover model (Stiglitz, 1974), the fair wage-eﬀort hypothesis 
(Akerlof and Yellen, 1990) and the insider-outsider hypothesis (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988).
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future ﬁnancing or investments, similarly to cash dividends.2 Current ﬁnancial research 
is concerned with cash dividends and stock repurchases, and thus studies of cash 
expenditures on wages, particularly the reasons for wage rigidity are infrequent. We 
explain upward and downward wage rigidity from the accounting and ﬁnancial points of 
view.
This paper argues that senior managerial attempts to manage future risk are one of 
the root causes of wage rigidity. Fluctuations in performance, which are considered to 
be a proxy for corporate ﬁnancial risk, are one of its indirect causes. The ﬁndings of 
this study are as follows. Among businesses experiencing improved performance, the 
probability of future ﬁnancial risk is greater if their past reported earnings has ﬂuctuated 
widely. To reduce possible future risk, managers may decide to reduce workers’ wages: 
the greater the ﬂuctuation in performance in previous years, the greater the decline in 
wages, the smaller the wage elasticity coeﬃcient and the stronger is the upward rigidity. 
On the other hand, if reported earnings have been more stable in previous years, future 
ﬁnancial risks are less likely. In this case, managers may choose to raise employee wages: 
the more stable the firm’s performance, the greater the extent of this wage increase 
is likely to be, the larger the wage elasticity coefficient and the stronger the upward 
ﬂexibility. Among businesses experiencing a decline in performance, the probability that 
managers will reduce wages is greater the more widely that performance has ﬂuctuated 
in previous years. In addition, the wage elasticity coeﬃcient is greater and the downward 
ﬂexibility stronger. The more stable business performance has been in previous years, the 
greater the extent of the increase in wages, the smaller the wage elasticity coeﬃcient and 
the stronger the downward rigidity.
This paper explains wage rigidity at the enterprise level from the ﬁnancial point of 
view. Its main contributions are: (1) to expand the body of research about the eﬀect of 
a company’s ﬁnances on changes in employee wages, and (2) to enrich the literature 
on the impact of performance volatility and the signiﬁcance of employee wage levels in 
enterprises from the ﬁnancial accounting perspective. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Part 2 presents a literature 
review; Part 3 discusses the institutional context, theoretical analysis and research 
assumptions; Part 4 covers the samples, variables and variable deﬁnitions; Part 5 presents 
the descriptive statistical analysis; Part 6 covers the empirical analysis and Part 7 the 
robustness tests; and, ﬁnally, Part 8 discusses the study’s ﬁndings.
2 In terms of large cash outflows, we believe that changes in wage movements are very similar to dividends: 
ﬁrst, because they lead to large changes in the amount of corporate cash available, which may aﬀect future 
investments and financing and second, because dividends also exhibit rigid characteristics. The growth of 
enterprises with an increase in dividends is greater than that of enterprises with a decrease in dividends, and the 
extent of a dividend decrease is generally far greater than that of an increase (Skinner and Soltes, 2008). Lintner 
(1956), Benartzi et al. (1997), Howatt et al. (2009), Lu and Wang (1999), Li and Song (2007), Skinner and 
Soltes (2008), and Kormendi and Zarowin (1996) have all investigated changes in dividends. Research in 
China and other countries has concluded that changes in a company’s wages policy signal the market that its 
level of corporate risk has altered, and performance persistence and volatility can proxy for changes in corporate 
risk. The findings and methodology of previous research on changes in cash dividends serve as a valuable 
reference for our study on changes in wages.
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2. Literature Review
Drawing on the literature about interpretations of dividend changes, we employ 
performance volatility as a proxy for future business risk in order to explain the causes 
of wage rigidity from the ﬁnancial point of view. This study links together aspects of the 
literature on wage rigidity, the impact of performance volatility and the signiﬁcance of 
wages in enterprises.
2.1. Explanation of Wage Rigidity Provided by Economic Theory 
Economic theory argues that wage rigidity differs by firm type. Downward wage 
rigidity has been explained at the institutional and economic theory levels. The 
institutional level considers the eﬀects of wage legislation, trade unions and a collective 
consultation system. If a firm is subject to mandatory wage legislation, strong trade 
union power and robust collective bargaining mechanisms, then wages will display 
characteristics of downward rigidity. Only after a negotiated agreement with employees 
may wages be reduced (Holden, 1994). Economic theory includes contract theory 
(Fischer, 1977), implicit contract theory (Baily, 1974), the sabotage model of eﬃciency 
wage theory (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), the gift exchange model (Akerlof, 1984), the 
adverse selection model (Weiss, 1990), the employee turnover model (Stiglitz, 1974), 
the fair wage-effort hypothesis (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990) and the insider-outsider 
hypothesis (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988).
Neither the institutional nor economic theory literature explains wage rigidity on 
the basis of an enterprise’s ﬁnancial situation. Nor is ﬁnancial situation or ﬁnancial risk 
management used to explain downward such rigidity. Although we adopt an enterprise-
level deﬁnition of wage rigidity,3 we believe that the deﬁnition and interpretation of such 
rigidity stems from the actual business situation of enterprises. Our approach differs 
from previous economic theory literature because our deﬁnition of wage rigidity covers 
both upward and downward rigidity. This two-pronged approach and our explanation 
of the two types of wage rigidity from the financial point of view are the main 
contributions of this study.
2.2. Information Content of Performance Volatility
A company’s performance is to a large extent influenced by the risks that result 
from its operating and ﬁnancial activities. Performance volatility is attributable to the 
inherent uncertainty of ﬂuctuations in revenue and operating costs. It also results from 
the financial costs of the interest on debt financing, changes in workers’ wages, and 
so on. Many studies show that performance volatility conveys information about a 
company’s level of risk to the market (Howatt et al., 2009) and that higher degrees of 
3 The deﬁnition of rigidity in economic theory is based on the individual.
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volatility have a negative eﬀect on ﬁrm value (Allayannis and Weston, 2003; Barnes, 
2001). Other studies are concerned about the impact of performance volatility on 
forecasts of future performance (Minton et al., 1999; Dichev and Tang, 2009; Petrovic 
et al., 2009; Brennan and Hughes, 1991; Schipper, 1991). Financial analysts and 
institutional investors are generally reluctant to make predictions about the performance 
of enterprises with higher levels of volatility because doing so may increase their forecast 
error and result in negative surprises (Badrinath et al., 1989). Enterprises that exhibit 
extreme performance volatility may reverse faster (Freeman, Ohlson and Penman, 1982), 
while high volatility may be due to the inclusion of temporary items, the sustainability 
of which is unlikely. Performance volatility may also have an impact on a company’s 
future ﬁnancing costs (Trueman and Titman, 1988), as it signals a higher likelihood of 
failure.
Another line of research has examined the impact of cash flow volatility on firm 
performance. For example, Minton and Schrand (1999) reported that cash ﬂow volatility 
is positively correlated with average levels of capital expenditure, research and advertising 
costs, and significantly and negatively correlated with the cost of external financing. 
Allayannis and Weston (2003) reported that cash flow volatility has a significantly 
negative correlation with ﬁrm value. Moreover, the negative impact on ﬁrm value from 
fluctuations in accounting profits is of greater statistical and economic significance. 
These ﬁndings are entrenched in the ﬁnancial and accounting literature (Petrovic et al., 
2009).
As performance volatility conveys information to the market about firm value, 
future performance and future ﬁnancing costs, we are interested in determining whether 
management is aware of the inherent informational value of earnings volatility and 
quality and that it subsequently takes action to control risks. 
3. Institutional Background: Theoretical Analysis and Hypotheses
Since the time of the socialist transformation of production in China in the mid-
1950s, the wages in state-owned enterprises have been subject to planned control, with 
graded salaries being the norm. This has resulted in a fairly low degree of production 
efficiency in state-owned enterprises. To promote initiative at both the firm and 
employee levels, the Chinese government began in the 1980s to issue a series of 
macro-control measures on the distribution of national income, such as linking pay 
to performance and instituting ﬂexible pay plans, thereby changing the original wage 
system pattern. After nearly two decades of reform, both urban and rural incomes have 
increased, and individuals have realized signiﬁcant improvements in their quality of life. 
At the same time, however, the income gap has widened over the years (Lin, 2007) and 
now exceeds reasonable limits (Chen, 2007). To prevent income polarization among 
employees and to ensure that the principle of equity is met, towards the end of the 
1900s the State implemented macro-control measures about wage allocation, including 
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labor market and wage guidelines and minimum wage regulations. These measures have 
been primarily administrative in nature and lack rigid enforcement,4 and no mechanism 
is yet in place to monitor their implementation or verify their results5 (Yang, 2008).
To ensure continued improvement in living standards and to overcome defects and 
irregularities in the wage distribution system within enterprises, the central and local 
governments now require companies to establish a mechanism for the normal growth 
of wages of full-time employees. The 52nd administrative paper from the bureau of the 
People’s Government of Shandong Province (2007) states that all enterprises should 
ensure appropriate growth in wages and that a reasonable reduction in wages is allowed 
only if there is a decline in proﬁts and a democratic process is followed. The government 
also regulates the wages of corporate executives, ruling that they cannot claim a wage 
increase if the average wages of their employees have experienced annual increases. This 
macro-level wage control may contribute to the downward rigidity of wages.
Labor unions play a key role in the decision-making process of firms in many 
Western countries with regard to wage changes. By 2000 China promulgated ‘the 
Interim Measures on collective wage negotiations,’ and these have had some positive 
eﬀects (Zhou, 2008; Guan, 2008). Because of status inequality, power imbalance and 
information asymmetry between employees and employers, employees often do not 
know how, or dare not negotiate with their employers, thus making the negotiation 
system meaningless (Zhou, 2008). The government has failed to enforce the wage 
guidelines it has issued, so that executives usually play the leading role in wage decisions 
and ultimately they have the freedom to allocate higher wages to themselves6 (Zeng and 
Chen, 2006; Li, 2006).
As the agents of shareholders, executive managers will likely consider the company’s 
future ﬁnancial risk when it deliberates about wage changes. This is due in part to ﬁrm 
value being affected by financial risk (Allayannis and Weston, 2003; Barnes, 2001). 
Financial risk includes ﬂuctuations in foreign exchange rates, interest rates and product 
prices. Moreover, because of the imperfection of capital markets, the corporate risks 
related to agency costs, transaction costs and the costs of external ﬁnancing are important 
factors in determining a company’s future ﬁnancial condition. The management of such 
risks may be one way of improving ﬁrm value and beneﬁting shareholders (Bartram, 
2000). In addition, increased volatility in a company’s performance in previous years 
4 The government has both economic and political goals for wage and employment regulations. However, it 
retains stricter control over the number of employees than their wages, which may ultimately lead to excess 
employment in state-owned enterprises (Zeng and Chen, 2006).
5 Dong Keyong, director of the School of Public Administration at China Renmin University, holds the view 
that wages are like weather forecasts, which work as reference frames. Under market economy conditions, 
wages, or the price of labor, should be determined on the basis of the supply of labor and the demand of 
employers. Government wage guidelines work as macro-level guidance and reference, but should not be relied 
upon to increase wages (Yang, 2008).
6 For more detailed information, please refer to Li (2006). Managerial compensation and wages are far higher 
than the average wage level in China Ping An and other listed companies in the insurance and banking 
industries, a good example of the corporate right to freely allocate higher wages to executives.
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adds to the unpredictability of its future performance, thus increasing the possibility of 
future ﬁnancial risks. Fixed costs such as wages, dividends, and interest may reduce ﬁrm 
liquidity.
Either explanation increases financial distress, which can propel the company 
into a vicious circle: if its past performance ﬂuctuated signiﬁcantly, this indicates the 
uncertainty of its future performance (cash ﬂows), which might indicate the possibility 
that its liquidity will be insuﬃcient to meet the aforementioned ﬁxed costs. Hence, we 
can expect a decline in the company’s earning ability or solvency and a negative impact 
on its future investments (Minton and Schrand, 1999). If there is any doubt about a 
company’s ability to fulﬁll its payment obligations in full and on time, its transaction 
costs increase significantly. The costs resulting from financial distress or insufficient 
liquidity are determined by the degree or likelihood of decreased liquidity (Bartram, 
2000).
The fluctuation of firm performance may be the best signal of firm risk (Howatt 
et al., 2009). Research has shown that the more volatile its previous performance, 
the harder it is to predict its future performance accurately (Minton et al., 2002), the 
quicker the change in its mean reversal (Freeman, Ohlson and Penman, 1982), and the 
more likely its expected earnings will be negative (Badrinath et al., 1989). These factors 
may be accompanied by an increase in future financing costs (Minton and Schrand, 
1999) and the possibility of ﬁnancial distress. By observing ﬂuctuations in performance, 
management may be able to measure the direct or indirect costs arising from ﬁnancial 
distress or poor liquidity. These costs include the visible costs related to clients, suppliers, 
employees and creditors, as well as such recessive costs as direct contract costs and the 
indirect costs resulting from the transfer of employees and executives to competitors in 
response to ﬁnancial distress (Bartram, 2000). Executives may seek to pre-empt these 
potential risks by engaging in risk management promptly. Although risk management 
cannot lower the direct and indirect costs of financial distress, it can reduce the 
likelihood of that distress and of liquidity shortfalls (Bartram, 2000).
Increasing the firm’s cash reserves is an important objective of executive risk 
management. Firms require signiﬁcant reserves of cash for such outlays as loan interest, 
cash dividends and wages. The interest on loans affords little flexibility, and cash 
dividends are decided by general shareholders meetings. However, the cash paid to 
employees is under managerial control, particularly in China, where labor unions are 
weak and collective wage negotiation is merely a formality (Zhou, 2008). 
Our goal in this paper is to use the ﬁnancial perspective to explain why ﬁrm wages 
exhibit rigid characteristics. We are particularly interested in the following questions. 
Why do the wages in certain firms decline instead of increasing and why do they 
exhibit upward rigidity rather than upward ﬂexibility when annual performance is on 
the upswing? Why do the wages in some ﬁrms increase rather than decline, and exhibit 
downward rigidity rather than downward ﬂexibility when annual performance is on the 
decline? One reason for such wage rigidity may be the executive-level management of 
potential ﬁnancial risks in the face of performance ﬂuctuation.
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How should a firm’s past performance fluctuation be viewed when investigating 
wage rigidity? We agree that prior performance fluctuation contains information 
about a company’s level of risk (Minton et al., 1999; Dichev and Tang, 2009; Petrovic 
et al., 2009; Brennan and Hughes, 1991; Schipper, 1991). The more volatile a ﬁrm’s 
performance has been in the past, the less stable and predictable its future performance is 
likely to be. Analysts and investors cannot predict future performance on the basis of the 
company’s historical ﬂuctuation or changes in current performance. It is the contention 
of this paper that to a large extent, the more volatile a company’s historical performance, 
the greater the likelihood that it needs to manage ﬁnancial risks.
Management needs to consider whether and how to change workers’ wages in the 
face of either an improvement or deterioration in ﬁrm performance. Wage changes diﬀer 
from changes in managerial salaries because they involve significantly larger absolute 
amounts of money. This in turn may aﬀect future corporate ﬁnancing, investments and 
sustainability, as well as future labor costs and productivity of the workforce. Thus, wage 
decisions involve a trade-oﬀ between costs and beneﬁts.
Labor costs and the level of effort expended by the workforce are not affected 
by fluctuations in performance, but rather performance volatility affects the costs of 
ﬁnancial distress. Relative to a stable company, the ﬁnancial distress costs of a volatile 
company are larger. These costs include those that arise from managerial risks and from 
failing to take measures to reduce potential future ﬁnancial risks. A sense of fairness is 
deeply rooted in Chinese culture, and workers’ perceptions of fairness are an important 
determinant of the level of eﬀort they exert. The perception of fairness has a positive 
eﬀect on workers’ level of eﬀort and productivity and on corporate proﬁts. If wages are 
reduced and workers feel unfairly treated, then they are less likely to work hard, which 
will impact negatively on the corporation. If management ignores this the net effect 
may be that ﬁnancial distress costs become much larger than the costs of adjusting the 
current wage level. Therefore, management is more likely to actively manage risk. The 
cost of increasing wages (or the beneﬁt of decreasing them) would thus be larger, which 
reduces the likelihood of increasing wages when the corporation performs better (upward 
rigidity), but increases the likelihood of doing so when performance declines (downward 
elasticity). The situation is asymmetrical.
In enterprises in which performance has improved in the current year, but where 
performance has fluctuated widely in previous years, management is still likely to 
reduce wages to manage future ﬁnancial risk. The greater the ﬂuctuation, the greater the 
likelihood of such a reduction. If the improved performance is expected to last, then 
the lower the degree of elasticity, the stronger the upward rigidity. If a company’s past 
performance was relatively stable, then the likelihood of future ﬁnancial risk is low, and 
management may raise workers’ wages to motivate them to work harder.7 The more 
stable the company’s former performance, the larger the extent of the workers’ pay rise 
7 In addition to encouraging workers to work harder, government policy establish a normal wage increase 
mechanism may be another reason that companies increase wages. 
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and the stronger the upward wage elasticity. 
Based on the foregoing discussion, we propose the following hypothesis.
H1: In corporations whose performance has improved in the current year, the coeﬃcient 
of wage elasticity is negatively correlated with former performance volatility.
In corporations in which performance has deteriorated in the current year, and where 
the ﬂuctuation in performance in former years has been large, management will tend 
to reduce workers’ wages to manage future ﬁnancial risk. The greater the ﬂuctuation, 
the greater the likelihood of such a reduction. If the deterioration in performance does 
not ease, then the larger the coeﬃcient of wage elasticity, the stronger the downward 
elasticity. 
If a corporation exhibited relatively stable former performance, the low degree 
of fluctuation would signal to the market that the company has a low likelihood of 
future ﬁnancial risk. If the company’s performance remains stable, even though it has 
deteriorated in the current year, management may still raise employees’ wages. The more 
stable the former performance and the larger the extent of improvement in the current 
year’s performance, the smaller the coeﬃcient of wage elasticity and the stronger the 
downward wage rigidity. This discussion leads us to posit our second hypothesis.
H2: In corporations whose performance deteriorated in the current year, the coeﬃcient of 
wage elasticity is positively correlated with former performance volatility.
4. Sample, Data and Deﬁnition of the Variables
4.1. Sample
Our research sample comprises companies listed as A-shares on the Shenzhen and 
Shanghai Stock Exchanges. Companies included have been listed since 1999, they pay 
annual wages ranging from 8,000 to 200,000 Yuan, and they have been in continuous 
existence for at least ﬁve years.8 After eliminating companies in the ﬁnance industry and 
those with missing data, 7,347 observations of 933 companies are detailed in Table 1.
8 We required the companies in our sample to have existed for five or more years to ensure that we could 
compute increased wages and performance. Companies with data missing for a certain year were eliminated. 
Companies that delisted before 2007 were included, as long as they met the ﬁve-year survival requirement, 
which reduces the problem of survival bias.
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Panel A of Table 1 displays the distribution of the sample companies by their period 
of existence. Panel B of Table 1 displays the sample distribution by industry and year.
4.2. Data
Our research data were obtained from the WIND and CCER databases. Data on the 
number of workers at the end of each year from 2002 to 2007 were collected manually 
from the websites of the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges. Market data for all 
provinces from 2001 to 2005 were obtained from the ‘Market Index of China’ (Fan, 
Wang and Zhu, 2007). The market data for 2006 and 2007 are assumed to be the same 
as for 2005.
Table 1. Sample Distribution
Panel A: Sample Distribution by Length of Existence
Years of continuous existence 5 years 6 years 7 years 8 years 9 years Total
Number of companies 87 90 117 198 441 993 
Number of samples 435 540 819 1584 3969 7347 
Panel B: Sample Distribution by Industry and Year
Industry 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
Agriculture, forestry, 
livestock farming, ﬁshery
7 9 19 17 19 19 19 19 19 147
Mining 3 6 8 8 9 9 9 6 6 64
Manufacturing 303 423 482 525 565 559 555 540 497 4449
Utilities 19 25 30 34 37 36 36 36 33 286
Construction 8 10 11 11 15 15 15 14 14 113
Transportation 19 28 33 39 44 44 44 43 41 335
IT 22 28 34 41 49 48 48 46 41 357
Wholesale and retail trade 52 62 60 67 66 65 65 65 61 563
Real estate 16 17 26 30 34 32 30 29 28 242
Social services 20 29 29 29 29 29 28 27 25 245
Communication and cultural 
industry 6 6 7 8 8 8 8 8 7 66
Comprehensive 40 49 58 59 58 58 55 55 48 480
Total 515 692 797 868 933 922 912 888 820 7347
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4.3. Deﬁnition of the Variables
The names and deﬁnitions of the dependent variables, main independent variables 
and control variables used in this research are displayed in Table 2.
Table 2. Variable Names, Codes and Deﬁnitions
Variable Name Variable Code Variable Deﬁnition
Average Wage Wt
Cash paid to and on behalf of employees in T period9/number of 
employees at the end of T period
Growth Rate of Wage PWt
(Wages in T period minus wages in T-1 period) x100/wages in T-1 
period, (Wt-Wt-1) x 100/Wt-1
Growth Rate of Performance PPt
(Performance in T period minus performance in T-1 period) x 100/ 
performance in T-1 period, ( Pt-Pt-1) x 100/Pt-1,
Wage Elasticity Coeﬃcient ELAt
Growth rate of wages in T period/Growth rate of performance in T 
period, PWt /PPt
Standard Deviation of Performance10 VP(t-4, t-1) Standard deviation of performance from T-4 period to T-1 period
Quality of Proﬁt QPt-1 Ratio of operating proﬁt contributed to total proﬁt in T-1 period
Continued Performance Improvement 
Dummy Variable CIt
CI is 1 if performance continues to improve from T-4 period to T-1 
period, and 0 otherwise
Continued Performance Deterioration 
Dummy Variable CDt
CD is 1 if performance continues to deteriorate from T-4 period to 
T-1 period, and 0 otherwise
Change in Number of Employees PNEt
(Number of employees at the end of T period minus number of 
employee at the end of T-1 period) x 100/number of employees at 
the end of T-1 period
Level of Wages LWt-1 Common logarithm of average wages in T-1 period, LOG10(W)
Leverage LEVt Debt at the end of T period x 100/assets at the end of T period
Size SIZE Common logarithm of assets at the end of the year
Investment Expenditure INV Ratio of net cash ﬂows from investing activities to total assets
Cash Dividends DIV Cash dividends per share
Actual Controller STATt STAT is 1 if company is state-owned, and 0 otherwise
Trading Status STt ST is 1 if company stock has a special trading status, and 0 otherwise
Market Index MIt From ‘Market Index of China’ (Fan, Wang and Zhu, 2007)
Consumer Price Index CPIt
Consumer Price Index taken from the China Statistical Information 
website
Unemployment Rate UEMt
Unemployment rate in the area in which the company operates, 
taken from the China Statistical Information website
GDP Growth GDPt
GDP growth in the area in which the company operates, taken from 
the China Statistical Information website
Industry Dummy Variable IND1-IND11 12 major industry categories based on CSRC industry classiﬁcation standards
9 For companies listed on the Chinese mainland, we were able to obtain information on the cash paid to and on 
behalf of employees from companies’ cash ﬂow statements. This index is obviously less exact than the cash paid 
to employees (Chen, Shen and Zhou, 2009), which is primarily mandatory. Part of the cash paid on behalf 
of employees is voluntary for the company and accords with its exact operating conditions, a situation that 
agrees with our research objectives. This index includes the narrow dimension of cash payments such as wages, 
bonuses and allowances. Wages remain stable, whereas bonus amounts ﬂuctuate and are easily controlled by 
management.
10 We use ROA, ROE and OROA to represent performance. Each return index is adjusted by adding the cash 
paid to and on behalf of employees.
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We use per capita cash ﬂow, which includes basic wages, bonuses and allowances, as a 
substitute for wages. Bonuses may vary depending on current performance, but may not 
adjust to changes in that performance in a timely fashion, a problem we address in our 
robustness tests.
We define the coefficient of wage elasticity as the ratio of the current year’s wage 
increase rate and current year’s performance increase rate (PW/PP). We claim that 
the wage is flexible if this variable is positive. The larger is this variable, the greater 
the elasticity of the wage and the greater the positive relativity between wages and 
performance. The wage is considered rigid if this variable is negative.11 The smaller is the 
variable, the more rigid the wage and the larger the negative relativity between wages and 
performance. Similar to Chen, Shen and Zhou (2009), we diﬀerentiate between upward 
and downward elasticity and upward and downward rigidity.
With reference to the research carried out by Howatt et al. (2009), Jayaraman 
(2008), Dichev et al. (2009) and Petrovic et al. (2009), we use the standard deviation of 
the performance in the last three years of period T as our proxy index of performance 
volatility. If an observation was missing data for the last three years of period T, then it 
was eliminated from the regression. In addition, to determine the inﬂuence of average 
performance on the coeﬃcient of wage elasticity and to ensure the robustness of our 
conclusions, we also regressed CV and variance as the proxy variables of performance 
fluctuation in our robustness tests, in which we also analyzed ROE and different 
performance indexes, including ROA and OROA.12 Following Petrovic et al. (2009), 
we also included operating proﬁt in our research, mainly because it does not include 
non-operating proﬁt, thus helping to alleviate the inﬂuence of earnings management on 
performance ﬂuctuation. 
To control the direction of performance ﬂuctuations, we set continued performance 
improvement and deterioration dummy variables. We then cross-multiplied the 
continued performance improvement dummy variable (CI) and continued performance 
deterioration dummy variable (CD) by the continued performance ﬂuctuation variable.
11 Refer to the deﬁnition of downward rigidity in the labor economics ﬁeld, which states that workers’ wages may 
increase even when company performance deteriorates. We deﬁne upward wage rigidity as a decrease in wages 
even when company performance improves. According to this deﬁnition, if the coeﬃcient of wage elasticity is 
negative, then wages appear to be rigid; if this coeﬃcient is positive, then wages appear to be elastic.  
12 Although cash can be viewed as a performance index, we focus on accounting performance. Numerous 
accounting studies have demonstrated that accounting proﬁt is more reﬂective of companies’ true performance, 
for example Dechow (1994), Dechow, Kothari and Watts (1998), and Ball and Shivakumar (2006). The 
research carried out by Allayannis and Weston (2003) also showed that companies’ cash flow fluctuations 
had no obvious inﬂuence on ﬁrm value, whereas ﬂuctuations in accounting proﬁt were remarkably negatively 
correlated with that value.
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We also controlled for earnings quality, initially using the contribution of operating 
proﬁt to total proﬁt (QPt-1) in period T-1. In the robustness test, we then employed the 
average proportion of operating proﬁt in total proﬁt for periods T-4 to T-1. We used 
this index to measure earnings quality because operating proﬁt does not contain such 
temporal inﬂuences as non-operating income/expenses that would reduce the continuity 
of performance (Dichev et al., 2009).
If the change13 in the number of workers in the current term (PNEt) and the wage 
level in the last term (LWt-1) are abnormally high or low, then current wages and current 
performance may change inversely. Thus we also controlled for this possibility. The 
existence of wage rigidity may result from companies’ self-adjustment according to their 
financial status and may arise from government intervention in companies’ market-
oriented decisions. Thus, we controlled for the degree of marketization (MI) in the 
location in which the company operates. This index reﬂects the macro-environmental 
conditions in which companies make their market-oriented decisions, and includes 
such sub-indexes as the relationship between market and government, and the level 
of development in the input market. Because ﬁnancing costs diﬀer by company type 
(Petrovic et al., 2009), we controlled for such ﬁrm-level characteristics as industry, scale 
and debt ratio. To investigate whether the performance fluctuations of companies in 
good (non-ST companies) and bad operating conditions (ST companies) have diﬀerent 
eﬀects on wage policy, we retained the latter in our sample,14 but controlled for them by 
adding an ST dummy variable. As workers’ wages constitute a substantial ﬁnancial outlay 
for a company, we controlled for other substantial outlays such as capital investments, 
based on cash dividend research (Kormendi and Zarowin, 1996), to analyze whether the 
latter inﬂuence companies’ wage policies. In addition, as the prevailing macro-economic 
conditions may have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on ﬁrm performance (Klein and Marquardt, 
2006) and both labor and ﬁrm decisions (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), we also included 
a macro-economic index, composed of GDP, the unemployment rate,  of the district in 
which a company is located.
13 We conducted correlation analysis of the rate of wage change and the rate of change in the number of 
employees, and found them to be signiﬁcantly negatively correlated at the 0.01 level. Hence, we controlled 
for the change in the number of employees when we analyzed the eﬀect of performance volatility on the wage 
elasticity coeﬃcient.
14 The asset-liability ratio of individual companies is negative because the sample is partially comprised of ST 
enterprises.
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5. Descriptive Statistics 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables
Table 3 provides descriptive information on the sample.
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics15
Variables N MIN P5 P25 MEDIAN P75 P95 MAX MEAN V
W 6414 8023 11983 20502 31562 51758 105918 199154 41459 30834
PW 6414 -93.86 -32.98 -2.57 12.83 31.89 91.20 1196.76 21.01 56.99
ROA 6414 -50.55 -4.72 4.61 7.59 11.23 19.01 30.64 7.48 7.76
OROA 6414 -85.18 -4.09 3.82 6.97 10.58 18.20 32.99 7.01 7.09
PROA 6414 -28439.15 -153.25 -22.79 -0.48 23.81 156.47 97368.18 29.07 1740.25
POROA 6414 -22786.47 -153.29 -24.82 -0.49 27.80 192.73 150249.85 49.37 2257.61
ELA_ROA 6414 -28191.45 -6.28 -0.51 0.09 1.02 6.44 1748.66 -4.10 355.20
ELA_OROA 6414 -6678.31 -5.38 -0.47 0.08 0.90 5.94 946.67 -0.46 86.36
VROA 4966 0.00 0.32 0.93 1.81 3.61 10.48 33.67 3.12 3.87
VOROA 4966 0.01 0.33 0.96 1.75 3.28 7.90 31.28 2.65 2.79
QP 6414 -23726.64 23.81 84.03 96.79 100.66 111.82 25974.13 88.28 462.55
PNE 6414 -97.58 -29.6 -5.20 0.32 10.28 61.60 5145.82 11.02 100.46
SIZE 6414 18.61 19.95 20.66 21.18 21.84 22.91 25.96 21.28 0.93
LEV 6414 -30.21 17.66 35.89 48.87 61.33 77.99 354.20 48.74 19.45
UEM 6414 1.30 2.11 3.37 3.95 4.27 4.9 6.50 3.78 0.88
MI 6414 0.33 4 5.52 6.86 8.99 10.06 10.41 7.18 2.01
GDP 6414 8.10 9.6 11.50 12.80 14.50 15.2 23.80 12.83 1.94
Note:  W= wages; PW= wage growth; ROA= total return on assets; OROA= operating proﬁt margin of assets; PROA= 
growth rate of total return on assets; POROA= operating margin growth rate of assets; ELA_ROA= wage elasticity 
coefficient calculated by performance indicators’ ROA; ELA_OROA= wage elasticity coefficient calculated by 
performance indicators’ OROA; VROA= standard deviation of ROA; VOROA= standard deviation of OROA; 
QP= earnings quality; PNE= the rate of change in the number of employees; SIZE= ﬁrm size/logarithm of assets; 
LEV= ﬁrm ﬁnancial leverage; UEM= unemployment rate in local of operation; MI= market-oriented index; and 
GDP= GDP growth rate in local of operation.
15 The total sample is 7,347 ﬁrm-years and the sample from 1999 to 2002 is included because of the need to 
compute the performance variance of the last three years. The sample is 6,414 from 2002 to 2007.  The actual 
sample is 4,966 ﬁrm-years in the regression for computing the ﬁrm volatility. 
PERFORMANCE VOLATILITY AND WAGE ELASTICITY:
AN EXAMINATION OF LISTED CHINESE ASHARE ENTERPRISES 123
Table 4. Distribution of Sample Characteristics by Year16
Year
Upward
Elasticity
Upward
Rigidity
Downward
Elasticity
Downward
Rigidity CPI
N % N % N % N %
1999 46 8.93 204 39.61 233 45.24 32 6.21 -1.4
2000 207 29.91 96 13.87 143 20.66 246 35.55 0.4
2001 214 26.85 68 8.53 190 23.84 325 40.78 0.7
2002 303 34.91 89 10.25 187 21.54 289 33.29 -0.8
2003 344 36.87 110 11.79 180 19.29 299 32.05 1.2
2004 352 38.18 99 10.74 176 19.09 295 32.00 3.9
2005 304 33.33 90 9.87 211 23.14 307 33.66 1.8
2006 394 44.37 135 15.20 134 15.09 225 25.34 1.5
2007 449 54.76 100 12.20 74 9.02 197 24.02 4.8
Note:  The last column shows the Consumer Price Index (CPI) from 1999 to 2007. 
Table 3 also provides the distribution of the main variables. The median of wage 
(W) and wage growth (PW) are significantly lower than the mean, which indicates 
that the distribution of wages and wage growth is uneven. Although the number of 
enterprises with high levels of wages or wage growth is small, the wages and wage growth 
of these few enterprises are relatively large, which is basically consistent with the wage 
distribution of non-listed companies reported in previous research (Chen, Shen and 
Zhou, 2009).  Performance and performance volatility are distributed more evenly and 
are similar to the median and mean. The median (QP 96.79) and mean (QP 88.28) of 
earnings quality are fairly evenly distributed. According to the coeﬃcient of elasticity, the 
medians of ELA_ROA and ELA_OROA are 0.09 and 0.08, respectively, which indicates 
that the wage elasticity sample is larger than the wage rigidity sample. 
Due to the dependent variable for wage elasticity being calculated from the ratio of 
the wage growth rate (PW) and the growth rate of the total return on assets (PROA), 
there are more outliers in the following multiple regression analysis, and thus the 
Winsorization process is adopted. 
5.2. Distribution of Firm Characteristics 
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics by year for the sample, which is divided into 
four categories based on ﬁrm characteristics.
16 We also describe the sample by industry, areas (market) and property of the ﬁrms, but we do not ﬁnd any 
obvious rule.
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Table 4 shows that between 1999 and 2007, the proportion of the sample exhibiting 
upward elasticity increased year on year from 8.93% to 54.76% and that the proportion 
exhibiting downward elasticity decreased from 45.24% to 9.02%. The ratio of upward 
and downward elasticity samples increased from 54.17% in 1999 to 63.78% in 2007. 
The proportion of the sample exhibiting downward rigidity over this period increased 
from 6.21% to 24.02%, whereas the proportion exhibiting upward rigidity declined. 
From the perspective of wage changes, the number of enterprises that increased wages 
(exhibiting upward elasticity and downward rigidity) increased year on year, from 
15.14% in 1999 to 78.78% in 2007. 
5.3. Sub-Portfolio Analysis of Business Performance Improvement and Deterioration
We divided 4,966 observations of the business performance improvement and 
decline samples into 10 portfolios in accordance with the standard deviation of 
performance. Table 5 provides the median of wage elasticity, wage characteristics and 
elasticity coeﬃcient of each portfolio.
Table 5.
Panel A: Distribution of Wage Characteristics of Different Performance Volatility Portfolios of 
Companies with Improved Performance
Portfolio Wage Characteristics Frequency (F) Median of Wage Elasticity  Ratio: F1/F2
1 Upward elasticity 209 1.02 4.10
Upward rigidity 51 -0.68
2 Upward elasticity 206 1.16 3.81
Upward rigidity 54 -0.66
3 Upward elasticity 204 1.38 3.64
Upward rigidity 56 -0.43
4 Upward elasticity 222 1.17 5.84
Upward rigidity 38 -0.63
5 Upward elasticity 228 1.11 7.13
Upward rigidity 32 -0.84
6 Upward elasticity 214 1.17 4.65
Upward rigidity 46 -0.34
7 Upward elasticity 195 0.99 3.00
Upward rigidity 65 -0.31
8 Upward elasticity 193 0.78 2.88
Upward rigidity 67 -0.17
9 Upward elasticity 191 0.48 2.77
Upward rigidity 69 -0.10
10 Upward elasticity 175 0.32 2.06
Upward rigidity 85 -0.21
Note:  The ﬁfth column is the ratio of the number of the two types of enterprises. 
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In Panel A of Table 5, in accordance with the standard deviation of performance, 
the sample is divided into 10 combinations. The proportion of observations in the ﬁrst 
(upward elasticity) and second quadrants (upward rigidity) declines as performance 
volatility increases. The distribution of the number of enterprises is consistent with 
our expectations. According to the median of each portfolio’s standard deviation of 
performance, wage elasticity is gradually reduced from 1.02 to 0.32, whereas the 
standard deviation of performance in the upward elasticity sample increases with 
volatility. Wage elasticity increases from -0.68 to -0.21, whereas, in line with our 
expectations, the wage elasticity of the upward rigidity sample increases with volatility.
Table 5.
Panel B: Distribution of Wage Characteristics of Different Performance Volatility Portfolios of 
Companies with Deteriorating Performance
Portfolio Wage Characteristics Frequency (F) Median of Wage Elasticity  Ratio: F1/F2
1 Downward elasticity 64 0.55 0.37
Downward rigidity 172 -1.10
2 Downward elasticity 89 0.52 0.60
Downward rigidity 148 -0.95
3 Downward elasticity 92 0.47 0.63
Downward rigidity 145 -1.04
4 Downward elasticity 79 0.43 0.50
Downward rigidity 157 -1.17
5 Downward elasticity 96 0.52 0.68
Downward rigidity 141 -0.64
6 Downward elasticity 83 0.55 0.54
Downward rigidity 154 -1.23
7 Downward elasticity 90 0.55 0.62
Downward rigidity 146 -0.90
8 Downward elasticity 90 0.35 0.61
Downward rigidity 147 -0.73
9 Downward elasticity 85 0.40 0.56
Downward rigidity 152 -0.57
10 Downward elasticity 90 0.49 0.62
Downward rigidity 146 -0.48
Note:  The ﬁfth column is the ratio of the number of two types of enterprises. 
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Panel B of Table 5 shows that among ﬁrms with deteriorating performance, higher 
levels of performance volatility lead to the ratio of the two types of ﬁrms exhibiting a 
weak increasing trend. The ratio of the smallest volatility portfolio is 0.37 and that of the 
largest is 0.68, which, to a certain extent, shows that the percentage of ﬁrms exhibiting 
downward elasticity gradually increases with an increase in performance volatility. 
This outcome is in line with our expectations. The median of wage elasticity for each 
portfolio as well as the median of downward elasticity for the ﬁrms changed little with 
an increase in performance volatility. However, the median of downward rigidity for the 
ﬁrms increased gradually, from -1.10 to -0.48 with such an increase. This indicates that, 
contrary to our expectations, performance declined by 1%, the median wage of Portfolio 
one increased by 1.1% and that of portfolio ten by only 0.48%. 
Table 5 indicates that the wage elasticity of the upward elasticity and downward 
rigidity samples exhibits significantly decreasing or increasing trends with increased 
performance volatility. Wages in these two types of businesses have increased, which 
suggests that, relative to their counterparts that have decreased wages, the managers of 
these ﬁrms are more concerned about past performance volatility. 
5.4. Time-Series Characteristics of Wage Elasticity
 In order to investigate whether wage elasticity is self-relevant, we analyze the time-
series characteristics of wage elasticity and examine the following regression model. 
ELA_Pt = α + ßELA_Pt-1 + ε.
We conduct separate regressions of the two types of wage elasticity coefficients 
calculated by two types of variables (ROA and OROA) and ﬁnd no correlation between 
any of the coeﬃcients in periods t and t+1. The ß in the two regressions are -0.0001 
and 0.00001, respectively, which do not pass the statistical signiﬁcance test and are thus 
of no economic signiﬁcance. We therefore infer that there is no continuity of elasticity; 
rather, managers adjust wages largely based on possible future changes in ﬁnancial risk. 
6. Empirical Tests
6.1. Univariate Tests
To explain why wages exhibit upward and downward rigidity, we carried out mean 
and median tests of performance volatility and earnings quality respectively, for ﬁrms 
undergoing performance improvement and decline by using wages as a single-factor 
explanatory variable (see Table 6).
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Panel A of Table 6 shows that the mean and median of the standard deviation of the 
return on assets (VROA) are 4.38 and 2.53, respectively, in the upward elasticity sample, 
which are both higher than those in the upward rigidity sample. After excluding the 
eﬀects of nonrecurring gains and loss, the standard deviation of the operating return on 
assets (VOROA) exhibits the same result. Both the mean and median of VOROA in 
the upward elasticity sample are signiﬁcantly higher than those in the upward rigidity 
sample at the 0.01 level.
In line with our expectations, the mean and median of VROA (VOROA) are 2.67 
(2.41) and 1.69 (1.68), respectively, in the downward elasticity sample, which are both 
lower, but insigniﬁcantly so, than those in the downward elasticity sample: 2.81 (2.47) 
and 1.75 (1.71). 
Table 6.
Panel A: Results of Mean and Median Tests of Performance Volatility in Enterprises with Improved 
Performance
Variables Character Sample Number Mean T-value Median Z-value
VROA Upward Elasticity 2037 3.23 3.68*** 1.80 4.80***
Upward Rigidity 563 4.38 2.53
VOROA Upward Elasticity 2037 2.71 4.08*** 1.75 2.61***
Upward Rigidity 563 3.30 2.17
Table 6.
Panel B: Results of Mean and Median Tests of Performance Volatility in Enterprises with 
Deteriorating Performance
Variables Character Sample Number Mean T-value Median Z-value
VROA Downward Elasticity 858 2.81 1.05 1.75 0.79
Downward Rigidity 1508 2.67 1.69
VOROA Downward Elasticity 858 2.47 0.60 1.71 0.42
Downward Rigidity 1508 2.41 1.68
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6.2. Multiple Regression Tests
Considering that outliers will aﬀect our research conclusions, we winsorized the top 
and bottom 1% of the outliers of the wage elasticity coefficient (ELA), performance 
volatility and earnings quality. To gain a more comprehensive understanding of how 
the other variables aﬀect the relationship between performance volatility and the ELA, 
we conducted separate OLS multiple regression tests for H1 and H2 by building the 
following multiple regression model.
ELA_(O)ROAt =  α + ß1V(O)ROA(t-4,t-1) + ß2QPt-1 + ß3PNEt + ß4LWt-1 + ß5V(O)
ROA(t-4, t-1) × LWt-1 + ß6CDt + ß7CIt + ß8CDt×V(O)ROA(t-4,t-1) + 
 ß9CIt × V(O)ROA(t-4,t-1) + ß10SIZEt + ß11LEVt + ß12INVt + ß13DIVt 
+ ß14STAT + ß15ST + ß16MI + ß17UEM + ß18GDP + ß19-29IND1-11 + 
 ß30-34Y2003-2007 + ε.
6.2.1. Tests of H1
To test H1, we ran a multiple regression for the samples with an increase in ROA, 
with the results reported in Table 7.
Table 7.
Panel A: OLS Multiple Regression for Samples with an Increase in ROA
Regression (1) Regression (2)
Variable Name Variable Code Coeﬃcient T-value Coeﬃcient T-value
Constant INT 2.22*** 16.51 4.62 1.51
Standard deviation of return on assets VROA -0.10*** -4.09 -0.05* -1.80
Quality of proﬁt QP 0.003 1.02
Change in number of employees PNE -0.003*** -4.08
Wage level LW -1.02*** -5.30
Continuing deterioration CD -0.49 -0.69
Continuing improvement CI -0.78 -1.19
Interactive options CD × VROA -0.03 -0.29
Interactive options CI × VROA 0.20** 1.98
Control variables Controlled
N 2600
0.006
16.73***
2600
ADJR2 0.033
F 3.97***
Note:  This regression was run for the samples that had shown an increase in ROA. The dependent variable is the wage 
elasticity coefficient (ELA_ROA), and the main independent variable (VROA) is the standard deviation of 
ROA from the t-4 period to the t-1 period. In this model, we controlled for the following variables: QP (the ratio 
contributed by operating proﬁt to total proﬁt) in the t-1 period, PNE (the change in the number of employees) 
in the t period, LW (wage level) in the t-1 period, the CD (continuing deterioration) and CI (continuing 
improvement) dummy variables, and two interactive options (CD×VROA and CI×VROA). Other variables were 
controlled, including SIZE, LEV (leverage), the STAT dummy variable, the ST dummy variable and a number of 
macroeconomic variables (market index, unemployment rate, GDP, industry, year, etc.). ***, ** and * indicate that 
the empirical results are signiﬁcant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively.
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Regression (1) in panel A of Table 7 provides evidence to show that without 
controlling the other variables, VROA and ELA_ROA are significantly negatively 
correlated at the 0.01 level, which is consistent with our expectations. After controlling 
the other related variables, the results of regression (2) remain consistent with our 
expectations, but with higher explanatory power, increasing from 0.006 to 0.035. The 
signiﬁcantly negative correlation of VROA and ELA_ROA at the 0.01 level suggests that 
the higher the volatile performance, the more that wages will be reduced relative to that 
performance and, as a result, the lower the wage elasticity coeﬃcient. This regression 
result also indicates that managers carried out corresponding risk management to 
address the large degree of performance volatility. Although the current performance 
of their ﬁrms had improved, because of the large degree of performance volatility in 
previous years, the managers still restricted the amount of cash paid to and on behalf 
of employees, and hence wages exhibited upward rigidity. In ﬁrms whose performance 
had remained stable over the past few years and whose ﬁnancial situation was healthy, 
in contrast, it was possible for managers to increase the wages of their employees. As 
their current performance had also improved, wages exhibited upward elasticity. This 
ﬁnding is not only consistent with risk management theory, but also supports H1. The 
coeﬃcient of interactive options (CI×VROA) is 0.20, which is signiﬁcantly positive at 
the 0.05 level, indicating that the more that performance continues to improve, the 
greater the growth rate and the more upwardly ﬂexible are wages.
Given that nonrecurring gains and losses may be due to wage changes, we carried out 
further regression analysis on the wage elasticity coeﬃcient and performance volatility. 
This was calculated on the basis of operating return on assets (OROA) excluding the 
eﬀect of nonrecurring gains and losses (see Panel B, Table 7).
Table 7.
Panel B: OLS Multiple Regression for Samples in Which OROA Had Increased
Regression (1) Regression (2)
Variable Name Variable Code Coeﬃcient T-value Coeﬃcient T-value
Constant INT 2.09*** 13.75 3.60 1.13
Standard deviation of operating return 
on assets VOROA -0.10*** -2.70 -0.05 -1.29
Quality of proﬁt QP 0.01*** 4.26
Change in number of employees PNE -0.003*** -4.06
Wage level LW -0.81*** -4.05
Continuing deterioration CD -0.73 -0.97
Continuing improvement CI 0.79 1.00
Interactive options CD×VOROA -0.01 -0.07
Interactive options CI×VOROA -0.09 -0.04
Control variables Controlled
N 2573
0.01
7.30***
2573
ADJR2 0.03
F 3.79***
Note:  This regression is run for the samples that had shown an increase in OROA. The dependent variable is the wage 
elasticity coefficient (ELA_ROA), and the main independent variable (VOROA) is the standard deviation of 
OROA from the t-4 period to the t-1 period. In this model, we controlled for the following variables: PNE (change 
in the number of employees) in the t period, LW (wage level) in the t-1 period, the CD (continuing deterioration) 
and CI (continuing improvement) dummy variables, and two interactive options (CD×VROA and CI×VROA). 
The other variables that were controlled include SIZE, LEV (leverage), the STAT dummy variable, the ST dummy 
variable and a number of macroeconomic variables (market index, unemployment rate, GDP, industry, year, etc.). 
***, ** and * indicate that the empirical results are signiﬁcant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively.
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Regression (1) in panel B of Table 7 provides evidence to show that without 
controlling the other variables, VOROA and ELA_ROA are significantly negatively 
correlated, which is consistent with our expectations. After controlling the other related 
variables, the coeﬃcient of VOROA in regression (2) is -0.05, which is consistent in sign 
with our expectations, but not signiﬁcant.
The following conclusions can be drawn from Table 7. Regardless of whether a ﬁrm’s 
current performance had improved, the more its performance had ﬂuctuated in previous 
years, the greater the possibility that it would face ﬁnancial risks in future, and hence 
the greater the possibility that wages would be cut to reduce the probability of future 
financial risk and a shortfall in liquidity. As a result, wages exhibit upward rigidity. 
The more volatile is ﬁrms’ performance, the lower the wage elasticity coeﬃcient and 
the stronger the upward wage rigidity. In companies whose performance had realized 
improvements in the current year and had been stable in previous years, the probability 
of future ﬁnancial risk was smaller. Thus, their managers may have decided to increase 
staﬀ wages to comply with government macro-control measures and to further their own 
economic interests. Salaries are therefore seen to manifest upward elasticity. The more 
stable performance had been in previous years, the higher the wage elasticity coeﬃcient 
and the stronger the upward wage elasticity.  
6.2.2. Tests of H2
To test H2, we ran a multiple regression for the samples in which ROA had 
decreased, with the results presented in Table 8.
Regression (1) in panel A of Table 8 provides evidence to show that VROA and 
ELA_ROA are signiﬁcantly positively correlated at the 0.01 level, which to a certain 
extent supports H2. After controlling the other related variables, the signiﬁcance level 
of the VROA coeﬃcient remained the same (whereas the T-value changed from 3.36 
to 3.10) and the goodness of fit reached 0.03, which means that VROA’s power to 
explain the wage elasticity coeﬃcient is partly replaced by the other variables. Although 
the performance of these ﬁrms declined in the current year, the more stable was their 
performance in previous years, the fewer ﬁnancial risks they were likely to face in future, 
and the more likely that they would increase wages. Wages in these ﬁrms thus exhibited 
downward rigidity. In those companies in which performance had both deteriorated 
in the current year and ﬂuctuated in previous years, wages were likely to be reduced 
and exhibited downward elasticity. We also carried out further regression analysis after 
excluding the eﬀect of nonrecurring gains and losses (see Panel B of Table 8).
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Regression (2) in panel B of Table 8 provides evidence to show that VOROA and 
ELA_ROA are signiﬁcantly positively correlated at the 0.01 level, which to a certain 
extent supports H2. After controlling the other related variables, the signiﬁcance level of 
the VROA coeﬃcient changed from 0.01 to 0.05.
Table 8 indicates that despite a current decline in performance, if (a) a company’s 
performance had exhibited stability in recent years, (b) the ﬁnancial situation is good 
and (c) the likelihood of future ﬁnancial risk is small, then managers may still raise staﬀ 
wages to comply with government macro-control measure and to further their own 
economic interests. Therefore, salaries in such ﬁrms manifest downward rigidity. The 
more stable the performance in previous years, the lower the wage elasticity coeﬃcient 
and the stronger the downward wage rigidity. In those companies in which performance 
both decreased in the current year and ﬂuctuated in previous years, however, managers 
are likely to cut staﬀ wages to reduce the probability of future ﬁnancial risk. Downward 
elasticity thus manifests itself in the wages of these firms. The more volatile is the 
performance in previous years, the higher the wage elasticity coeﬃcient and the stronger 
the downward wage elasticity. 
Table 8.
Panel A: OLS Multiple Regression for Samples in which ROA had Decreased
Regression (1) Regression (2)
Variable Name Variable Code Coeﬃcient T-value Coeﬃcient T-value
Constant INT -6.90*** -4.54 -4.35 -0.92
Standard deviation of return on assets VROA 18.24*** 3.36 16.75*** 3.10
Quality of proﬁt QP -0.007 -1.13
Change in number of employees PNE 0.01*** 5.00
Wage level LW 1.35*** 4.88
Continuing deterioration CD -1.92 -1.24
Continuing improvement CI -3.42** -2.41
Interactive options CD×VROA 0.31 1.05
Interactive options CI×VROA 0.60** 2.44
Control variables Controlled
N 2366
0.01
11.29***
2366
ADJR2 0.03
F 3.56***
Note:  This regression was run for the samples where ROA had decreased. The dependent variable is the wage elasticity 
coeﬃcient (ELA_ROA), and the main independent variable (VROA) is the standard deviation of ROA from the 
t-4 period to the t-1 period. In this model, we controlled the following variables: QP (that ratio of operating proﬁt 
contributed to total proﬁt) in the t-1 period, PNE (change in the number of employees) in the t period, LW (wage 
level) in the t-1 period, the CD (continuing deterioration) and CI (continuing improvement) dummy variables, 
and two interactive options (CD×VROA and CI×VROA). The other variables controlled include SIZE, LEV 
(leverage), the STAT dummy variable, the ST dummy variable and a number of macroeconomic variables (market 
index, unemployment rate, GDP, industry, year, etc.). ***, **and * indicate that the empirical results are signiﬁcant 
at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively.
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7. Robustness Checks
To further test the stability of our results, we conducted the following robustness 
checks.
7.1. Replacement of Key Indicators
We used the standard deviation of the return on total assets (ROA) and the operating 
return on total assets (OROA) as an alternative indicator of performance volatility. In 
this robustness check, we used the proﬁt growth rates when calculating wage ﬂexibility 
and the wage elasticity coeﬃcients. The regression results are presented in Table 9. The 
use of variance and the coeﬃcient of performance variation as alternative indicators of 
performance volatility did not change the regression results substantially.
Table 8.
Panel B: OLS Multiple Regression for Samples in which OROA had Decreased
Regression (1) Regression (2)
Variable Name Variable Code Coeﬃcient T-value Coeﬃcient T-value
Constant INT -2.06 -10.11 -7.43* -1.76
Standard deviation of operating return 
on assets VOROA 0.18*** 2.94 0.18** 2.77
Quality of proﬁt QP -0.01** -2.26
Change in number of employees PNE 0.01*** 4.75
Wage level LW 1.28*** 4.99
Continuing deterioration CD 2.10 1.45
Continuing improvement CI 1.13 0.84
Interactive options CD×VOROA -0.53** -1.97
Interactive options CI×VOROA -0.37 -1.31
Control variables Controlled
N 2393
0.003
8.62***
2393
ADJR2 0.028
F 3.29***
Note:  This regression was run for the samples in which OROA decreased. The dependent variable is the wage elasticity 
coeﬃcient (ELA_ROA), and the main independent variable (VOROA) is the standard deviation of OROA from 
the t-4 period to the t-1 period. In this model we controlled the following variables: PNE (change in the number of 
employees) in the t period, LW (wage level) in the t-1 period, the CD (continuing deterioration) and CI (continuing 
improvement) dummy variables, and two interactive options (CD×VROA and CI×VROA). The other variables 
controlled include SIZE, LEV (leverage), the STAT dummy variable, the ST dummy variable and a number of 
macroeconomic variables (market index, unemployment rate, GDP, industry, year, etc.). ***, ** and * indicate that 
the empirical results are signiﬁcant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively.
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Table 9.
Panel A: OLS Multiple Regression of the Sample with Increased Proﬁts
Regression (1) Regression (2)
Variable Code Coeﬃcient T-value Coeﬃcient T-value
INT 1.48 19.63 7.80*** 4.13
VP -0.08*** -4.71 -0.03* -1.75
QP 0.004* 1.90*
PN -0.003*** -5.33
LW -0.65*** -5.48
CD -0.03 -0.09
CI 0.16 0.46
CD×VP 0.0013 0.32
CI×VP 0.005 0.19
Control variables Controlled
N 2600
0.005
22.19***
2600
0.028
3.29***
ADJR2
F
Note:  This regression was run on the sample with increased proﬁts. The dependent variable is the wage elasticity coeﬃcient 
(ELA_e), and the main independent variable (VP) is the standard deviation of the return on total assets from the 
t-4 to t-1 periods. We controlled the change in the number of workers (PNE), the wage level (LW) in period t-1, 
the sustained reduction in performance (CD) and sustained growth (CI) dummy variables, and the performance 
ﬂuctuations in the interaction items CD×VP and CI× VP. Other variables, including ﬁrm size (SIZE), ﬁnancial 
leverage (LEV), the actual controller dummy variables STAT and ST, and such macroeconomic variables as the 
market index (MI), the unemployment rate (UEM), GDP, and industry and year dummy variables, were also 
controlled. ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively.
Table 9.
Panel B: OLS Multiple Regression of Sample with Decreased Proﬁts
Regression (1) Regression (2)
Variable Code Coeﬃcient T-value Coeﬃcient T-value
INT -1.54*** -9.11 -10.3*** -2.13
VP 0.14*** 2.89 0.12** 2.22
QP 0.003 0.64
PN 0.02*** 6.92
LW 0.94*** 3.27
CD -0.09 -0.07
CI 0.82 0.54
CD×VP 0.002 0.06
CI× VP -0.002 -0.01
Control variables Controlled
N 2366
0.003
8.33***
2366
0.05
3.75***
ADJR2
F
Note:  This regression was run on the sample with decreased proﬁts. The dependent variable is the wage elasticity coeﬃcient 
(ELA_e), and the main independent variable (VP) is the standard deviation of the return on total assets from the 
t-4 to t-1 periods. We controlled the change in the number of workers (PNE), the wage level (LW) in period t-1, 
the sustained reduction in performance (CD) and sustained growth (CI) dummy variables, and the performance 
ﬂuctuations in the interaction items CD×VP and CI×VP. Other variables, including ﬁrm size (SIZE), ﬁnancial 
leverage (LEV), the actual controller dummy variables STAT and ST, and such macroeconomic variables as the 
market index (MI), the unemployment rate (UEM), GDP, and industry and year dummy variables, were also 
controlled. ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively.
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It can be seen from Table 9 that the regression results on the wage elasticity 
coeﬃcient that we obtained by employing the proﬁt growth rate are similar to those 
obtained by using the return on total assets.
7.2. Adjustment of Nominal Wage Growth Rate to Real Wage Growth Rate
In this paper, we consider only the growth rate of nominal wages, which equals 
the wage difference between two adjacent periods divided by the wage level of the 
former period. By taking into account the impact of the CPI in diﬀerent years on wage 
adjustments, we adjusted the nominal wage in accordance with the following formula.
Real wage growth rate in period t = nominal wage growth rate in period t 
 minus the CPI in period t.
Formula (1) 
Using the adjusted real wage growth rate to redefine the rigidity and elasticity 
coeﬃcients, we obtained the regression results presented in Table 10.
Table 10.
Panel A: OLS Multiple Regression of Sample with Increased ROA
Regression (1) Regression (2)
Variable Code Coeﬃcient T-value Coeﬃcient T-value
INT -0.86*** -5.85 6.44** 2.06
VROA 0.23*** 7.68 -0.05* -1.72
QP 0.003 0.39
PN -0.003*** -4.10
LW -1.17*** -5.98
CD -0.42 -0.58
CI -0.86 1.30
CD×VROA 0.02 -0.19
CI×VROA 0.19* 1.93
Control variables Controlled
N 2600
0.018
58.92***
2600
0.037
4.20***
ADJR2
F
Note:  This regression was run on a sample with an ascending rate of return on total assets. The dependent variable is 
the wage elasticity coeﬃcient adjusted by the CPI, and the main independent variable (VROA) is the standard 
deviation of the rate of return on total assets in the t-4 to t-1 periods. We controlled the change in the number of 
workers (PNE), the wage level (LW) in period t-1, the sustained reduction in performance (CD) and sustained 
growth (CI) dummy variables, and the performance ﬂuctuations in the interaction items CD×VP and CI×VP. 
Other variables, including ﬁrm size (SIZE), ﬁnancial leverage (LEV), the actual controller dummy variables STAT 
and ST, and such macroeconomic variables as the market index (MI), the unemployment rate (UEM), GDP, and 
industry and year dummy variables, were also controlled. ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 
levels, respectively.
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The regression results remained basically unchanged when price changes were taken 
into account.
7.3. Adjustment of the Wage Elasticity Coeﬃcient Deﬁnition
We define the wage elasticity coefficient as the ratio of the wage growth rate in 
period t divided by the performance growth rate in period t-1. Taking into account that 
in reality wage adjustments may take place after performance changes, we adjusted our 
deﬁnition of the wage elasticity coeﬃcient according to the following formula.
 
Elasticity coeﬃcient = wage growth rate in period t divided by
 performance growth rate in period t-1. 
 Formula (2) 
The results of the regression run after redeﬁning the wage elasticity coeﬃcient are 
presented in Table 11.
Table 10.
Panel B: OLS Multiple Regression of Sample with Decreased ROA
Regression (1) Regression (2)
Variable Code Coeﬃcient T-value Coeﬃcient T-value
INT -19.30*** -42.50 -12.93*** -4.22
VROA 3.09*** 23.37 0.14** 2.49
QP -0.007 -1.28
PN 0.009*** 4.75
LW 1.14*** 4.37
CD -1.81 -1.22
CI -2.29 1.69
CD×VROA 0.22 0.77
CI×VROA 0.35 1.46
Control variables Controlled
N 2366
0.14
546.08***
2366
0.024
2.90***
ADJR2
F
Note:  This regression was run on a sample with a descending rate of return on total assets. The dependent variable is 
the wage elasticity coeﬃcient adjusted by the CPI, and the main independent variable (VROA) is the standard 
deviation of the rate of return on total assets in the t-4 to t-1 periods. We controlled the change in the number of 
workers (PNE), the wage level (LW) in period t-1, the sustained reduction in performance (CD) and sustained 
growth (CI) dummy variables, and the performance ﬂuctuations in the interaction items CD×VP and CI×VP. 
Other variables, including ﬁrm size (SIZE), ﬁnancial leverage (LEV), the actual controller dummy variables STAT 
and ST, and such macroeconomic variables as the market index (MI), the unemployment rate (UEM), GDP, and 
industry and year dummy variables, were also controlled. ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 
levels, respectively.
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Table 11.
Panel A: OLS Multiple Regression of Sample with Increased ROA
Regression (1) Regression (2)
Variable Code Coeﬃcient T-value Coeﬃcient T-value
INT 0.22*** 1.64 -0.11 -0.05
VROA -0.03 -1.27 -0.04 -1.25
QP -0.002 -0.58
PN -0.006 -0.77
LW -0.029 -0.15
CD -3.73*** -5.05
CI 1.89*** 2.77
CD×VROA 0.258** 2.19
CI×VROA -0.109 -1.04
Controlled
N 2245
0.002
1.62
2245
0.02
2.90***
ADJR2
F
Note:  This regression was run on a sample with an ascending rate of return on total assets. The dependent variable is 
the redeﬁned wage elasticity coeﬃcient, and the main independent variable (VROA) is the standard deviation 
of the rate of return on total assets in the t-4 to t-1 periods. We controlled the change in the number of workers 
(PNE), the wage level (LW) in period t-1, the sustained reduction in performance (CD) and sustained growth (CI) 
dummy variables, and the performance ﬂuctuations in the interaction items CD×VP and CI×VP. Other variables, 
including ﬁrm size (SIZE), ﬁnancial leverage (LEV), the actual controller dummy variables STAT and ST, and 
such macroeconomic variables as the market index (MI), the unemployment rate (UEM), GDP, and industry and 
year dummy variables, were also controlled. ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, 
respectively.
Table 11.
Panel B: OLS Multiple Regression of Sample with Decreased ROA
Regression (1) Regression (2)
Variable Code Coeﬃcient T-value Coeﬃcient T-value
INT -0.378** -2.39 -4.87* -1.78
VROA 0.027 0.62 -0.027 -0.54
QP -0.002 -0.33
PN 0.002 0.94
LW 0.25 1.1
CD -3.85*** -2.90
CI 1.71 1.41
CD×VROA 0.17 0.69
CI×VROA -0.05 -0.24
Controlled
N 2036
-0.002
0.38
2036
0.007
1.55**
ADJR2
F
Note:  This regression was run on a sample with a decreased rate of return on total assets. The dependent variable is the 
wage elasticity coeﬃcient redeﬁned by Formula (2), and the main independent variable (VROA) is the standard 
deviation of the rate of return on total assets in the t-4 to t-1 periods. We controlled the change in the number of 
workers (PNE), the wage level (LW) in period t-1, the sustained reduction in performance (CD) and sustained 
growth (CI) dummy variables, and the performance ﬂuctuations in the interaction items CD×VP and CI×VP. 
Other variables, including ﬁrm size (SIZE), ﬁnancial leverage (LEV), the actual controller dummy variables STAT 
and ST, and such macroeconomic variables as the market index (MI), the unemployment rate (UEM), GDP, and 
industry and year dummy variables, were also controlled. ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 
levels, respectively.
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It can be seen from Table 11 that when we lag the wage growth rate by one period, 
the sign of the one independent variable regression is contrary to our expectations. 
Although the sign of the multiple independent variable regression on performance 
ﬂuctuation is in accordance with our expectations, it does not pass the signiﬁcance test.
7.4. Regression on State-Owned and Private Enterprises
To determine whether the nature of firms’ property rights has an impact on the 
relationship between performance fluctuation and the wage elasticity coefficient, we 
employed state-owned and private enterprises as our regression samples. The results of 
the former sample are basically consistent with those of the full sample. In the private 
enterprise sample, however, the direction of the performance fluctuation impact on 
the wage elasticity coefficient is in line with our expectations, but does not pass the 
signiﬁcance test.
7.5. Regression with the Compensation and Number of Executives, Directors and 
Supervisors Excluded
When we removed the compensation paid to executives, directors and supervisors 
from that paid to employees and their numbers from the total number of employees, the 
regression results changed little and are basically in accordance with our expectations.
7.6. Performance Volatility over Four Years, Including Current Year Performance
Given that senior management takes into account the current year’s performance 
as well as the performance volatility of previous years, we also took it into account 
in our calculation of performance volatility. Thus, when calculating the indicators of 
performance ﬂuctuation, we used performance data for the current year as well as those 
for the past three years. The regression results using this revised calculation were still in 
line with our expectations and support our hypotheses.
7.7. Stability Test of Heteroscedasticity
To overcome the possible impact of heteroscedasticity and ensure the stability of 
inference, we used robust OLS estimates. The regression results were largely unaﬀected 
by heteroscedasticity and were in accordance with our expectations.
7.8. Excluding Abnormal Samples
We removed the outliers of the elasticity coefficient, performance, volatility and 
earnings quality from the top and bottom 1%, and the results remained basically 
unchanged.
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8. Research Conclusions and Limitations 
Taking A-share listed companies in China from 1999 to 2007 as our research 
sample, this article analyzes the causes of wage rigidity from the ﬁnancial perspective. 
We demonstrate that firms whose current performance has improved, but whose 
performance in previous years has ﬂuctuated, face a greater likelihood of future ﬁnancial 
risks, and thus their management may reduce employees’ wages to avoid those risks. 
The greater the ﬂuctuation in a ﬁrm’s former performance, the greater the decrease in 
employees’ wages, the smaller the wage elasticity coeﬃcient and the stronger the upward 
rigidity. If the ﬁrm’s performance in previous years was less volatile, then it is less likely to 
face ﬁnancial risks in future and management is more likely to increase staﬀ wages both 
in the interests of the company and to manage potential risk. The more stable the former 
performance, the greater the increase in wages, the larger the wage elasticity coeﬃcient 
and the stronger the upward elasticity. In ﬁrms whose performance is deteriorating, the 
greater the ﬂuctuation in its former performance, the more it decreases employee wages, 
the larger the wage elasticity coeﬃcient and the stronger the downward elasticity. The 
more stable that former performance, the more wages are increased, the smaller the wage 
elasticity coeﬃcient and the stronger the downward rigidity.
A limitation of this paper lies in its deﬁnition of wage elasticity. Such elasticity is 
deﬁned as the current wage growth rate divided by the current performance growth rate. 
There are two issues of concern regarding this deﬁnition. First, if the elasticity coeﬃcient 
is less than zero, then it is considered that wages exhibit rigidities. The definition 
exaggerates the downward ﬂexibility and upward rigidity samples to some extent because 
a drop in the average wage does not necessarily mean a decrease in the wage level, but 
may also result from a change in employee numbers or a ﬁrm’s internal structure. Even 
if we had controlled the variable for the change in employee numbers, this substantial 
deviation could not have been avoided. Second, our deﬁnition involves the assumption 
that wage adjustment is a short-term concept. In practice, however, wages (except for 
bonuses) may be adjusted every two or more years. We adjusted the deﬁnition of the 
wage elasticity coeﬃcient by employing the ratio of the wage growth rate over two years 
divided by the performance growth rate over two years, but the results were contrary 
to our expectations. Furthermore, a company’s operating leverage, cost structure, 
and ability to bargain with clients and suppliers may also aﬀect the ﬂexibility of wage 
adjustments. However, given the limited data available, we were unable to control such 
variables, which may have had an impact on the reliability of our conclusions.
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